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FOREWORD
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to
control damage from debris in the Shuttle operational
environment and to make the control measures a part of routine
launch flows. These measures include engineering surveillance
during vehicle processing and closeout operations, facility
and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and
photographic analysis of mission events.
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch,
on-orbit, and landing provide significant data in verifying
proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In
addition to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Photo/Video
Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space
Flight Center, and Rockwell International - Downey are also
included in this document to provide an integrated assessment
of the mission.
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Shuttle Mission STS-61 was launched at 4:27 a.m. local 12/2/93
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1.0 Su_,ary
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle
was conducted on 30 November 1993. The detailed walkdown of
Launch Pad 39B and MLP-2 also included the primary flight
elements OV-105 Endeavour (5th flight), ET-60 (LWT 53), and
BI-063 SRB's. There were no significant facility or vehicle
anomalies.
The vehicle was cryoloaded on 30 November 1993. There were no
Launch Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations. There were no ice/frost conditions outside of the
established data base and no IPR's were taken.
The launch was scrubbed at T-5 minutes due to local weather LCC
violations. A post drain inspection of the vehicle revealed no
significant anomalies.
The vehicle was cryoloaded a second time on 1 December 1993.
There were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303
criteria violations. There were no ice/frost conditions outside
of the established data base and no IPR's were taken.
After the 4:27 a.m. launch on 2 December 1993, a debris inspec-
tion of Pad 39B was performed. No flight hardware or TPS
materials were found. Damage to the pad overall was minimal.
The GH2 vent line was latched on the second tooth of the latch-
ing mechanism and had no loose cables (static retract lanyard).
However, the GH2 vent line was outside the south forward
flexhose support struts and offset 8-10 inches from the haunch
centerline. As a result, the latching mechanism was not
centered. The crossbeam between the GUCP legs showed signs of
contact with the static retract lanyard.
Further inspection revealed the GH2 vent line had engaged both
latch bars, scraped paint near the eighth tooth, and rebounded
back to the second tooth. Launch vibration may then have caused
the line to move south and disengage from the north latch bar.
An IPR documented the GH2 vent line movement and latching
process. Troubleshooting will include a planned replacement of
the shock absorber, re-evaluation of the latch plate/teeth
mechanism, and a series of drop tests.
A total of 127 films and videos were analyzed as part of the
post launch data review. No major vehicle damage or lost flight
hardware was observed that would have affected the mission. No
stud hang-ups occurred on any of the holddown posts. All T-0
umbilicals operated properly.
Orbiter ET/ORB umbilical motion picture film revealed nominal
separation of the SRB's from the ET. No detailed engineering
data of the External Tank after separation from the Orbiter was
obtained.
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The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after
retrieval. Both frustums had a combined total of 39 MSA-2
debonds over fasteners. A 2" x 0.5" x 0.2" divot occurred on
the leading edge of a GEI cork run (right forward segment XB-
1099 at 220 degrees). The remaining material was sooted and
most likely lost during ascent (IFA STS-61-I-01). Post flight
lab analysis determined the loss was not a material/processing
failure. The most probable cause of the cork loss is believed
to be a debris impact during ascent. Since no debris sources
were identified on the RH SRB forward of the damage site, ice
from the ET L02 feedline bellows has been cited as the leading
candidate.
The LH frustum was missing three BSM aero heat shield covers.
Preliminary post flight assessment revealed the covers had
opened and latched properly. The fracture planes on the cover
attach rings were not sooted, which may indicate the covers
were lost late in flight or at water impact.
A post landing inspection of OV-105 was conducted after the
landing at KSC. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 120 hits,
of which 13 had a major dimension of 1-inch or larger. The
Orbiter lower surface had a total of 59 hits, of which 7 had a
major dimension of 1-inch or larger. Based on these numbers and
comparison to statistics from previous missions of similar
configuration, both the total number of debris hits and the
number of hits 1-inch or larger was less than average.
Orbiter post landing microchemical sample results revealed a
variety of residuals in the Orbiter window samples that were
attributed to SRB BSM exhaust, Orbiter TPS, window protective
covers, natural landing site products, and paints/primers from
various sources. These residual sampling data do not indicate
a single source of damaging debris as all of the materials have
been documented previously in post-landing sample reports. The
residual sample data also showed no debris trends when compared
to previous mission data.
A total of five Post Launch Anomalies, including one In-Flight
Anomaly, were observed during the STS-61 mission assessment.
2.0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING
The Ice/Debris/TPS/Photographic Analysis Team briefing for
launch activities was conducted on 30 November 1993 at 0800
hours. These personnel participated in various team activities,
assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and
contributed to reports contained in this document.
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3.0 SCRUB - LOCAL IlII'J_'I"B]m:L
The first launch attempt of STS-61 was scrubbed at T-5 minutes
(extended hold) due to local weather LCC violations.
3.1 PRE-L_URCH SSV/P_D DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle
was conducted on 30 November 1993 from 0830-0930 hours. The
detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39B and MLP-2 also included the
primary flight elements OV-105 Endeavour (5th flight), ET-60
(LWT 53), and BI-063 SRB's. There were no significant debris
issues or ve_icle anomalies.
Foam insulation and primer on an ET intertank stringer near the
GUCP was damaged prior to final ordnance operations by a wind
blown debris catcher/net buckle under the ET GH2 vent line
access platform. Although not a cryogenic surface, the area was
repaired prior to cryoload.
3 .2 ICE/FROST INSPECTION
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was
performed on 30 November 1993 from 2315 to 0045 hours during
the two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations. There were no conditions outside of the established
data base and no IPR's were taken. Ambient weather conditions
at the time of the inspection were:
Temperature:
Relative Humidity:
Wind Speed:
Wind Direction:
68.8 Degrees F
69.1 Percent
14.9 Knots
041 Degrees
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) was used to obtain
vehicle surface temperature measurements (ref Figures 1 and 2)
for a thermal assessment of the vehicle
3.3 ORBITER
No Orbiter RCC panel or TPS anomalies were observed. All RCS
thruster paper covers were intact, though the paper on thruster
R4U had a yellow tint. Typical ice and frost accumulations were
present at the SSME heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces. The base
heat shield tiles were dry. An infrared scan revealed no
unusual temperature gradients on the base heat shield or engine
mounted heat shields.
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3.4 SOLID ROCKETBOOSTERS
The STI portable infrared scanner recorded RH and LH SRB case
temperatures of 66-70 degrees F. In comparison, temperatures
measured by a hand-held Minolta/Land Cyclops spot radiometer
averaged 68 degrees F. All measured temperatures were above
the 34 degrees F minimum requirement. The predicted Propellant
Mean Bulk Temperature (PMBT) supplied by MTI was 70 degrees F,
which was within the required range of 44-86 degrees F.
3.5 EXTERRAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run
from 2030 to 0530 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 3.
The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost accumulation
on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload.
Light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulation, was
observed by the Ice Team on the L02 tank. There were no TPS
anomalies. The portable STI measured surface temperatures that
averaged 66 degrees F on the ogive and 61 degrees F on the
barrel section. In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured
temperatures that averaged 65 degrees F on the ogive and 61
degrees F on the barrel; SURFICE predicted temperatures of 60
degrees F on the ogive and 54 degrees F on the barrel.
The intertank acreage exhibited no TPS anomalies. Typical
ice/frost accumulations and no unusual vapors were present on
the ET umbilical carrier plate. The on-pad repair to the area
of intertank CPR near the GUCP was intact and showed no
anomalies.
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Light amounts of
condensate, but no ice/frost, was present on the acreage and
aft dome. The portable STI measured surface temperatures that
averaged 57 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 62 degrees F on
the lower LH2 tank. In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer
measured temperatures that averaged 57 degrees F on the upper
and 62 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank, respectively; SURFICE
predicted temperatures of 56 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank
and 58 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank.
There were no anomalies on the bipod jack pad closeouts. A
crack, 12-inches long by 3/8-inch wide, was present in the -Y
vertical strut cable tray forward surface TPS near the longeron
closeout interface. The crack exhibited no offset and was not
filled with ice or frost. The presence of the crack was accept-
able for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria and no IPR was
required.
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02
feedline bellows and support brackets.
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There were no TPS anomalies or unusual accumulations of ice/
frost on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/frost fingers on the
separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge vents were typical.
Condensate was present in the LH2 recirculation line bellows
and the LH2 feedline bellows.
Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB
umbilical. Typical ice/frost fingers had formed on the pyro
canister and plate gap purge vents. Ice/frost was present on
the bondline of the aft pyro canister closeout indicating a
thermal short. There were no unusual vapors or cryogenic drips
during tanking and stable replenish.
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations/anomalies, which
were acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 criteria,
consisted of four OTV recorded items:
Anomaly 001 documented a crack 12-inches long by 3/8-inch wide
in the -Y vertical strut cable tray forward surface TPS. The
crack exhibited no offset and was not filled with ice or frost.
Anomaly 002 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations
on the LO2 and LH2 ET/ORB umbilicals, pyro can purge vents,
purge barrier, and LH2 recirculation line bellows/burst discs.
Anomaly 003 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations
on the LO2 feedline support brackets and bellows.
Anomaly 004 documented two ice/frost formations via OTV at the
cable tray support ramp XT-1528 and aft of the +Y ET/SRB cable
tray-to-vertical strut fairing closeout.
3.6 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and
properly configured for launch (LCC requirement). There was no
debris on the MLP deck or in the SRB holddown post areas.
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-0
umbilicals, the GH2 vent line, or the GUCP.
i0

Pre-launch configuration of ET intertank and GUCP. TPS on a
stringer near the GUCP was damaged by a wind blown debris net
buckle under the GH2 vent line access platform. Although not a
cryogenic surface, the area was repaired prior to cryoload.
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Pre-launch configuration of bipod jack pad closeouts
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Top photo shows pre-launch configuration of -Y vertical strut
cable tray forward surface TPS. A crack, 12" x 3/8", appeared
after cryoload (bottom photo). The crack exhibited no offset.
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3.7 POST DRAIN VEMICLE INSPECTION
A post-drain inspection was performed at Pad-39B from 1030 to
1130 hours on 1 December 1993.
The tumble valve cover on the External Tank was intact. The
nosecone footprint area was inaccessible for inspection.
No anomalies (divots or cracks) were observed on the L02 tank,
intertank, or LH2 tank acreage.
Ice remained in the L02 feedline support brackets, but no loose
foam or TPS damage was visible.
Bipod jack pad closeouts were intact and flush with adjacent
LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout foam.
A small crack in the -Y ET/SRB vertical strut cable tray
forward surface TPS (reported during the Ice Team Inspection)
was still visible.
No anomalies were observed on the Orbiter,
Boosters, or MLP deck.
Solid Rocket
No significant vehicle damage was discovered as a result of the
post drain inspection.
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No anomalies were visible on the GUCP, GH2 vent line, or
the TPS repair to the intertank stringer near the GUCP
15
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After drain, ice was still present on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical
outboard side, upper plate gap purge vent, pyro can purge vent,
and cable tray drain hole. No anomalies were observed.
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4.0 LAUNCH
STS-61 was launched at 93:336:09:26:59.983 GMT (04:27 am local)
on 2 December 1993.
4.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
A second pre-launch SSV/pad debris inspection was not performed
due to the 24 hour scrub turnaround.
4.2 ICE/FROST INSPECTION
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was
performed on 1 December 1993 from 2255 to 0001 hours during the
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There
were no Launch Commit Criteria, 0MRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations. There were no conditions outside of the established
data base and no IPR's were taken. Ambient weather conditions
at the time of the inspection were:
Temperature:
Relative Humidity:
Wind Speed:
Wind Direction:
68.5 Degrees F
68.5 Percent
14 Knots
055 Degrees
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning
radiometer was utilized to obtain vehicle surface temperature
measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle,
as shown in Figures 4 and 5.
4.3 ORBITER
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. All RCS
thruster paper covers, including the wet covers on the R4U and
L4L nozzles, were intact. Typical ice and frost accumulations
were present at the SSME #i and #2 heat shield-to-nozzle inter-
faces. An infrared scan revealed no unusual temperature
gradients on the base heat shield or engine mounted heat
shields.
4.4 SOLID ROCKTBOOSTERS
SRB case temperatures measured by the PSTI averaged 65-69
degrees F. In comparison, temperatures measured by a spot
radiometer ranged from 65 to 68 degrees F and the SRB GEI
measured temperatures ranging from 68 to 72 degrees F. This was
the first flight using reduced GEI instrumentation with only
four case acreage temperature sensors per SRM. All measured
temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum requirement.
The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature (PMBT) supplied
by MTI was 70 degrees F, which was within the required range of
44-86 degrees Fahrenheit.
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FIGURE 5. SSV INFRARED SCANNER
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4.5 EXTERNAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run
from 2000 to 0400 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 6.
The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost accumulation
on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload.
The Ice Team observed no ice/frost accumulations on the L02
tank though light condensate was present on the L02 tank ogive
and barrel sections. There were no TPS anomalies. Surface
temperatures as measured by the infrared radiometer averaged 58
degrees F on the ogive and 54 degrees F on the barrel section.
In comparison, SURFICE predicted temperatures of 57 degrees F
on the ogive and 53 degrees F on the barrel.
The intertank acreage exhibited no TPS anomalies. Typical
ice/frost accumulation, but no unusual vapor, was present on
the ET umbilical carrier plate. The radiometer measured a
surface temperature of 65 degrees F.
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Condensate, but
no ice or frost, was present on the acreage and aft dome. The
portable STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 54
degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 62 degrees F on the lower
LH2 tank. In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured
temperatures that averaged 52 degrees F on the upper and 60
degrees F on the lower LH2 tank, respectively; SURFICE
predicted temperatures of 54 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank
and 57 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank.
The bipod jack pad closeouts were intact and flush with
adjacent foam. A small ice/frost spot formed on the -Y bipod
spindle housing closeout bondline.
The crack in the -Y vertical strut cable tray forward surface
TPS near the longeron closeout interface had not changed since
the first tanking. An ice/frost accumulation 2-inches in
diameter had formed on the aft side of the -Y vertical strut,
but no TPS defect was visible.
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline
bellows and support brackets.
There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/
frost fingers on the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge
vents were typical.
Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both
burst disks was typical. The LH2 feedline bellows were frost
covered.
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Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB
umbilical purge barrier. Typical ice/frost fingers had formed
on the pyro canister and plate gap purge vents. Ice/frost was
present on the aft pyrotechnic canister closeout bondline
indicating a thermal short. The 17-inch flapper valve actuator
access port foam plug was properly closed out. No unusual
vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, stable
replenish, and launch.
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations/anomalies, which
were all acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 criteria,
consisted of four OTV recorded items:
Anomaly 001 documented a crack 12-inches long by 3/8-inch wide
in the -Y vertical strut cable tray forward surface TPS. The
crack exhibited no offset and was not filled with ice or frost.
The crack had not changed since the first tanking.
Anomaly 002 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations
on the LO2 and LH2 ET/ORB umbilicals, pyro can purge vents,
purge barrier, LH2 recirculation line bellows/burst discs, and
LH2 cable tray drain hole.
Anomaly 003 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations
on the LO2 feedline support brackets and bellows.
Anomaly 004 documented ice/frost formations on the forward and
aft sides of the +Y vertical strut fairing closeout.
4.6 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and
properly configured for launch (LCC requirement).
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-0
umbilicals, the GH2 vent line, or the GUCP.
No ET nosecone/ footprint damage was visible after the GOX vent
hood was retracted.
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Although wetted by internal vapors, the paper cover on
the RCS L4L thruster nozzle was intact
23
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Typical amounts of ice/frost had formed in the LO2 feedline
bellows and support brackets
24
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Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the ET/ORB LH2
umbilical. Ice/frost on the plate gap and pyro can purge vents,
cable tray drain hole, LH2 recirculation line bellows and burst
discs was also typical. No cryogenic drips or unusual vapors
appeared during tanking and stable replenish.
25
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5.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
The post launch inspection of the MLP, FSS and RSS was
conducted on 2 December 1993 from Launch + 1.5 to 3.5 hours.
No flight hardware or TPS materials were found. A i" x 1/4"
bolt was found on the west surface of the MLP deck near the FSS
crossover and originated from the facility.
A bolt was loose and a second missing from the E-15 camera
protective cover. A bolt was missing and a cover plate was
opened on the E-27 camera protective cover. Both cameras are
located on the north end of the RH SRB exhaust hole.
South SRB HDP erosion was typical. All south HDP EPON shoe shim
material was intact. There was no visual indication of a stud
hang-up on any of the south holddown posts. All of the north
HDP doghouse blast covers were in the closed position. The SRB
aft skirt purge lines and T-0 umbilicals exhibited typical
exhaust plume damage.
The Tail Service Masts (TSM), Orbiter Access Arm (OAA), and GOX
vent arm showed only minor damage. A platform handle on the
south side of the LH2 TSM was loose.
The GH2 vent line was latched on the second tooth of the latch-
ing mechanism and had no loose cables (static retract lanyard).
However, the GH2 vent line was outside the south forward
flexhose support struts and offset 8-10 inches from the haunch
centerline. As a result, the latching mechanism was not
centered. The crossbeam between the GUCP legs showed signs of
contact with the static retract lanyard.
Further inspection revealed the vent line had engaged both
latch bars, scraped paint near the eighth tooth, and rebounded
back to the second tooth. Launch vibration may then have caused
it to move south and disengage from the north latch bar. An IPR
documented the vent line moving past the eighth tooth and
latching on the second tooth. Troubleshooting will include a
planned replacement of the shock absorber, re-evaluation of the
latch plate/teeth mechanism, and a series of drop tests.
Typical damage to the facility included several loose/detached
signs and panel doors on the FSS and RSS. This type of damage
usually occurs after the vehicle clears the tower and is not
considered a debris threat.
All seven emergency egress slidewire baskets were secured on
the FSS 195 foot level and sustained no launch damage.
Debris inspections of the pad acreage, north flame trench,
beach, and areas outside the pad perimeter were performed. No
flight hardware or TPS material was found. Post launch pad
inspection anomalies are listed in Section i0.
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The Tail Service Masts showed only minor damage. A platform
handle on the south side of the LH2 TSM was loose.
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The GH2 vent line was latched on the 2nd tooth of the latching
mechanism and had no loose cables (static retract lanyard).
However, the line was outside the south forward flexhose sup-
port struts and offset 8-10 inches from the haunch centerline.
28
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6.0 FILM REVIEW AND PROBLEM REPORTS
Anomalies observed in the Film Review were presented to the
Mission Management Team, Shuttle managers, and vehicle systems
engineers. No In-Flight Anomalies were generated as a result of
the film review. Post flight anomalies are listed in Section
i0.
6.1 LAUNCH FILMANDVIDEO S_%RY
A total of 98 films and videos, which included thirty-six 16mm
films, twenty 35mm films, two 70mm films, and forty videos,
were reviewed starting on launch day.
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed
that would have affected the mission.
Prior to ignition, free burning hydrogen drifted under the body
flap and upward to the LH OMS pod. SSME ignition, Mach diamond
formation, and gimbal profile appeared normal (OTV 151, 163,
170, 171).
Fore-and-aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the
centerline area between the SSME cluster occurred during engine
start-up. The motion was similar to that observed on previous
launches (E-76, 77).
SSME ignition caused numerous pieces of ice to fall from the
ET/Orbiter umbilicals. Some pieces of ice contacted the umbili-
cal cavity sill and were deflected outward, but no tile damage
was visible (0TV 109).
Ten small particles appeared in the area between the RH OMS pod
and the vertical stabilizer and fell aft at 09:26:56.721 GMT.
The particles most likely originated from the top surface of
the OMS pod (E-2, 19).
One light colored particle fell past the SSME #1 nozzle during
ignition. The particle appeared to originate from the base heat
shield area, not the RH OMS pod (E-76) .
Surface coating material was lost from base heat shield tiles
outboard of SSME #3 (4 places), outboard of SSME #2 (2 places),
and between the SSME cluster (2 places) (E-17, 18, 19, 20).
A parts tag was loose on the RH SRB aft skirt nitrogen purge
line (E-8) .
A 6" x 1/2" tile gap filler, or shim, appeared in the body flap
hinge gap and fell aft during SSME ignition at 09:26:56:883 GMT
(E-17) .
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The Orbiter LH2 and L02 T-0 umbilicals disconnected and
retracted properly (OTV 149, 150, 163). GUCP disconnect from
the External Tank was nominal (E-33).
The GH2 vent line appeared to latch properly in film items E-42
and E-48, though a small amount of GH2 vent line movement was
visible in film item E-50 during the latching process. There
was no excessive slack in the static retract lanyard. Post
launch inspection found the GH2 vent line latched on the
second tooth of the latching mechanism.
No stud hang-ups occurred on any of the holddown posts. No
ordnance fragments or frangible nut pieces fell from any of the
DCS/stud holes. Debris, most likely SRB throat plug material,
was visible north of the MLP over the SRB flame trench after
T-0 (TV-4B).
A piece of the ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier (baggie) fell aft
of the Orbiter and past the left SRB shortly after the roll
maneuver (TV-4B).
Pieces of RCS paper covers were visible passing over the
Orbiter wings (E-59, 213, 222).
Three flashes occurred in the SSME plume during ascent (E-218,
223).
Numerous small pieces of aft skirt instafoam or chunks of
propellant dropped out of the SRB plume during ascent (E-57,
218, 223, TV-4B, TV-5) . This common event is more visible
during night launches.
At least seven pieces of SRB thermal curtain tape were
partially detached from the SRB thermal curtains. One 4 foot
piece of tape detached completely later in flight (E-207, 212).
TPS eroded/ablated in four places on the ET LH2 aft dome
manhole cover (E-207) .
Body flap movement (amplitude and frequency) was similar to
previous flights (E-208, 212, 220, 222).
ET aft dome charring and exhaust plume recirculation were
typical (E-208, 212, 220, TV-13) . Slag fell out of the SRB
plumes before, during, and after separation (TV-4B). SRB plume
tailoff and separation appeared normal.
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TPS eroded/ablated in four places on the External Tank LH2 aft
dome manhole cover - a normal occurrence. Pieces of SRB thermal
curtain tape partially detached from the SRB thermal curtains
in flight - also an expected occurrence.
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6.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO S[R4_Y
DTO-0312 was performed by the flight crew. Eighteen hand held
still images were obtained of the External Tank 36 minutes
after separation from the Orbiter. OV-105 was equipped to carry
umbilical cameras: 16mm motion picture with 5 mm lens and 35mm
still views. Due to dark conditions, data was not obtained for
External Tank separation.
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed
that would have been a safety of flight concern.
SRB separation appeared normal. A piece of SRB thermal curtain
tape appeared in the plume recirculation under the ET aft dome
(frame 770).
Erosion of TPS on the -Y vertical strut aft side and blistering
of the fire barrier on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical was typical.
Erosion of TPS from the LH2 cable tray aft surface was somewhat
greater than usual.
Very small pieces of TPS fell aft past the camera field of view
before, during, and after SRB separation.
6.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO S_M_%RY
A total of fifteen videos, four 16mm films, and seven 35mm
large format films, were reviewed.
Orbiter performance on final approach appeared normal. There
were no anomalies when the landing gear was extended. Touchdown
of the left and right main gear was nominal and almost simul-
taneous.
The drag chute was deployed after breakover, but before the
nose gear contacted the runway. Drag chute deployment appeared
nominal. The chute was blown slightly westward (-Y side of the
Orbiter) by prevailing winds.
No unusual APU exhaust plumes were observed either visually or
in the infrared imagery.
Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth.
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7.0 SRB POST FLIGHTIRETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
Both Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and
debris sources at CCAFS Hangar AF on 6 December 1993 from 0830
to 1100 hours. From a debris standpoint, both SRB's were in
good condition.
7.1 RH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The RH frustum was missing no TPS but had 22 MSA-2 debonds over
fasteners (Figure 7). Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint had
occurred in localized areas. The BSM aero heatshield covers
were locked in the fully opened position, though the upper
right and lower left cover attach rings had been bent by
parachute riser entanglement.
The RH forward skirt acreage exhibited no debonds or missing
TPS. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic base plates were intact.
Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred on the systems
tunnel cover and around the ET/SRB attach point. No pins were
missing from the frustum severance ring.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were
generally in good condition. Trailing edge damage to the FJPS
and the GEI cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension. A 2" x 0.5" x 0.2" divot
occurred on the leading edge of a GEI cork run (right forward
segment XB-1099 at 220 degrees). The remaining material was
sooted and most likely lost during ascent (IFA STS-61-I-01) .
Post flight lab analysis determined the loss was not a
material/processing failure. The most probable cause of the
cork loss is believed to be a debris impact during ascent.
Since no debris sources were identified on the RH SRB forward
of the damage site, ice from the ET L02 feedline bellows has
been cited as the leading candidate.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB
aft struts, ETA ring, IEA, and IEA covers appeared undamaged.
The aft booster stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were
intact and no K5NA material was missing.
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaminated. Aft
skirt acreage TPS was generally in good condition.
All four Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated
and appeared to have functioned properly (Figure 8). EPON shim
material is no longer bonded to the HDP #3 and #4 aft skirt
structure.
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The RH frustum was missing no TPS, but had 22 MSA-2 debonds
over fasteners. The BSM aero heat shield covers were locked in
the fully opened position, though two of the cover attach rings
had been bent by parachute riser entanglement.
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RH forward skirt acreage exhibited no debonds or missing TPS
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7.2 I_ SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The LH frustum had 17 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners. A 2"xl"
divot in the MSA-2 occurred between the +Y/-Z axes and the
275/318 ring frames (Figure 9). Minor blistering of the Hypalon
paint had occurred in localized areas. The lower right BSM aero
heat shield cover was locked in the fully opened position. The
other three BSM aero heatshield covers were missing. Prelimi-
nary post flight assessment revealed the covers had opened and
locked properly. The fracture planes on the cover attach rings
were not sooted, which may indicate the covers were lost late
in flight or at water impact.
The LH forward skirt acreage exhibited no debonds or missing
TPS. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic base plates were intact.
Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred near the ET/SRB
attach point and on the systems tunnel cover. No pins were
missing from the frustum severance ring.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good
condition. In general, minor trailing edge damage to the FJPS
and the GEI cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB
aft struts, ETA ring, IEA, and IEA covers appeared undamaged.
The stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were intact and no
K5NA material was missing.
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaminated. Aft
skirt acreage TPS was generally in good condition. Hypalon
paint was blistered/missing from the BTA closeouts. A 2-inch
crack occurred in the BTA on the aft ring.
All four Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated
and appeared to have functioned properly. EPON shim material is
no longer bonded to the HDP #7 and #8 aft skirt structure.
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section i0.
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The LH frustum had a total of 17 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners.
The lower right BSM aero heatshield cover was locked in the
fully opened position. The other three covers were missing.
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.Preliminary post flight assessment revealed the BSM aero heat
shield covers had opened and locked properly. The fracture
planes on the cover attach rings were not sooted, which may
indicate the covers were lost late in flight or at water impact
43

//
The LH forward skirt acreage MSA-2 exhibited no debonds or
missing TPS. Both RSS antenna covers/phenolic base plates were
intact.
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Aft skirt acreage TPS was generally in good condition. Hypalon
paint was blistered and/or missing from the Booster Trowellable
Ablator (BTA) closeouts.
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A 2-inch crack occurred in the BTA applied to the aft ring
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8.0 ORBITER POST IA%NDING DEBRIS ASSESSI_NT
A post landing debris inspection of OV-105 (Endeavour) was
conducted 13 December 1993 at the Kennedy Space Center on
Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) runway 33 and in the Orbiter
Processing Facility bay #I. This inspection was performed to
identify debris impact damage and, if possible, debris sources.
The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 120 hits, of which 13 had
a major dimension of one inch or greater. This total does not
include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to
SSME vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A
comparison of these numbers to statistics from 43 previous
missions of similar configuration (excluding missions STS-23,
25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42, which had damage from known
debris sources), indicates both the total number of hits and
the number of hits 1-inch or larger was less than average
(reference Figures 10-13).
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 59 hits, of
which 7 had a major dimension of 1-inch or greater. The
distribution of hits on the lower surface does not suggest a
single source of ascent debris, but indicates a shedding of
ice and Thermal Protection System (TPS) debris from random
sources.
The following table breaks down the STS-61 Orbiter debris
damage by area:
HITS > I" TOTAL HITS
Lower surface
Upper surface
Right side
Left side
Right OMS Pod
Left OMS Pod
7 59
2 53
0 1
0 2
4 4
0 1
TOTALS 13 120
The largest tile damage sites on the lower surface measured
5" x 1.5" x 0.125" (RH wing chine) and 2" x 2.5" x 0.25" (left
inboard elevon) . The shallow depth may be indicative of impacts
from low density objects.
A cluster of 17 hits near the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical may be
indicative of impacts from higher density materials, such as
ice.
Black deposits were present on LH wing RCC panel #6 and T-seal
#3.
Two small hits near the forward LH RCS pod, originally thought
to be micrometeorite hits, were the result of vibration damage
to previous tile repairs.
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FIGURE 10.
STS-61
DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS v
1.125 x .25 x .2---_
2.0 x 2.5 x .25_
17 hits < 1-inch
1.0 x 0.375 x 0.25
1.125 x .375 x
Z
_L
W
-J
.0 x .75 x .125
1.25 x .375 x .25
5.0 x 1.5 x .125
TOTAL HITS = 59
HITS > 1 INCH = 7
ALL DIMENSIONS
IN INCHES
Tile damaged in 4 places during
door opening - not counted in
hit count.
J
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FIGURE
STS-61
11.DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
_O_
XXXX 0
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TOTAL HITS = 5
HITS • 1 INCH = 4
FIGURE 12.
STS-61
DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
/
\
m
m
,mm,.m,m
--Possible micrometeorite hits.
Closer examination revealed
damage to previous tile repairs
instead.
Three tile damage areas adjacent
to the umbilical cooling flexline
may be the result of handling during
recovery operations and are not
included in the total count.
/_ ALL MEASUREMENTS IN INCHES
-- 0
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FIGURE
STS-61
13. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
Damage to window frame
perimeter tiles:
#1:6 < 1-inch
#2: 8< i-inch
#3:8 < 1-inch and
2 (1.25" x 0.75"
#4:9 < 1-inch
#5: 5< 1-inch
#6:0
4 hits less than 1-inch
TOTAL HITS = 53
HITS > 1 INCH = 2
ALL DIMENSIONS
IN INCHES
9 hits less than 1-inch
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No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels,
tires, or brakes. The right main landing gear inboard tire
showed tread wear from the landing on the KSC runway.
ET/Orbiter separation devices EO-I, EO-2, and EO-3 functioned
nominally. All ET/Orbiter umbilical separation ordnance reten-
tion shutters were closed properly. No debris was found on the
runway beneath the ET/ORB umbilical cavities. An insignificant
amount of foam, but no red purge seal, adhered to the LH2
ET/ORB umbilical plate near the LH2 4-inch recirculation line
flapper valve.
Orbiter windows #3 and #4 were moderately hazed with some
streaks on window #4_ Only a light haze was present on the
other windows. Surface wipes were taken from all windows for
laboratory analysis. Damage to the window perimeter tiles was
typical.
Tile damage on the base heat shield was typical. The Dome
Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blanket MR patches on all
three SSME's were in excellent condition and no material was
missing. Tiles on the vertical stabilizer "stinger" and around
the drag chute door were intact and undamaged.
Runway 33 had been swept/inspected by SLF operations personnel
prior to landing and all potentially damaging debris was
removed.
The post landing walkdown of Runway 33 was performed
immediately after landing. All Orbiter drag chute hardware was
recovered and showed no signs of abnormal operation. No organic
(bird) debris was found on the runway. Two Q-felt plugs, most
likely from the base heat shield area, were recovered in the
vicinity of the drag chute.
The Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) was used to measure the
surface temperatures of several areas on the vehicle (per OMRSD
V09AJ0.095). Seven minutes after landing, the Orbiter nosecap
RCC was 200 degrees F. Twenty-two minutes after landing, the RH
wing leading edge RCC panel #9 was 83 degrees F and panel #17
was 72 degrees F (Figure 14).
In summary, both the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits
and the number of hits 1-inch or larger was less than average
when compared to previous missions (reference Figures 15-16).
Orbiter Post Launch Debris Anomalies are listed in Section i0.
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FIGURE 14. STS.- 61 RCC TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS AS
RECORDED BY THE SHUTTLE THERMAL IMAGER
RCCPANEL 17 72
TIME 0049
RCC PANEL 9 83
TIME OO49
ORBITER:
MISSION:
105
STS-61
Landing Time: 0027 EST
ALL MEASUREMENTS IN
DEGREES FAHRENHEIT
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NOSECAP 200
TIME 0034
FIGURE 15: ORBITER POST FLIGHT DEBRIS DAMAGE SUMMARY
LOWER SURFACE ENTIRE VEHICLE
HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS
S TS_ 15 80 36 120
STS-8 3 29 7 56
STS-9 (41-A) 9 49 14 58
S TS-11 (41-B) 11 19 34 63
STS-13 (41-C) 5 27 8 36
ST_14 (41-D) 10 44 30 111
STS-17 (41-G) 25 69 36 154
S TS- l g (51-A) 14 66 20 87
STS-20 (51_C) 24 67 28 81
STS-27 (51-1) 21 96 33 141
STS-28 (51_J) 7 66 17 111
STS-30 (61-A) 24 t29 34 183
ST_31 (61-B) 37 177 55 257
STS-32 (61-C) 20 134 39 193
STS-29 18 100 23 132
S TS-28R 13 60 20 76
STS_34 17 51 18 53
STS_33R 21 107 21 118
STS_32R 13 111 15 120
STS_36 17 61 19 81
STS_31R 13 47 14 63
S TS-41 13 64 16 76
STS-38 7 7O 8 81
STS-35 15 132 I7 147
ST_37 7 91 10 113
STS,39 14 217 16 238
STS-40 23 153 25 197
STS-43 24 122 25 131
STS-48 14 100 25 182
S TS-44 6 74 9 101
STS-45 18 122 22 172
STS-49 6 55 11 114
STS-50 28 141 45 184
STS-46 11 186 22 236
STS-47 3 .z[8 11 108
STS-52 6 152 16 290
STS-53 11 145 23 240
STS-54 14[ 80 1,4. 131
STS-56 18 9_ 36 156
STS-55 I0 128 13 143
STS-57 10 75 12 106
STS-51 8 100 I8 154[
S TS-58 23 78 26 155
AVERAGE 1_.6 93.4 21.9 133.7
SIGMA 7.3 44.3 10.6 59.2
MISSIONS STS-23, 24, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 3OR, AND 42 ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS ANAL YSIS
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOURCES
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OV-105 Endeavour made the second night landing
at the Kennedy Space Center
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Overall view of the Orbiter right side
Note damage to a tile on the RH wing chine area
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The Orbiter lower surface tiles sustained a total of 59 hits,
of which 7 had a major dimension of 1-inch or greater. The
largest tile damage site on the lower surface was on the RH
wing chine and measured 5" x 1.5" x 0.125".
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Overall view of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation
ordnance devices functioned properly. No flight hardware was
found on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door was
opened.
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v
Forward inboard pyro canister closeout foam
adhered to the L02 ET/ORB umbilical plate
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Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation
ordnance devices functioned properly. No flight hardware was
found on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door was
opened.
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No significant amounts of ET foam or red purge seal adhered to
the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical plate near the LH2 4-inch line flapper
valve.
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/Orbiter windows #3 and #4 were moderately hazed. Some streaks
were present on window #4. Damage to window perimeter tiles was
typical.
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Tile damage on the base heat shield was typical. No tiles were
damaged by the drag chute door or risers. Dome Mounted Heat
Shield closeout blankets were in excellent condition.
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9.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS
A total of eight samples were obtained from 0V-105 Endeavour
during the STS-61 post landing debris assessment at Kennedy
Space Center. The samples consisted of 8 wipes from Orbiter
windows #1 - #8. The samples were analyzed by the NASA KSC
Microchemical Analysis Branch (MAB) for material composition
and comparison to known STS materials. Debris analysis involves
placing and correlating of particles and residues with respect
to composition, thermal (mission) effects, and availability.
Debris sample results/analyses are listed by Orbiter location
in the following summaries.
ORBITER WINDOWS
Samples from the Orbiter windows indicated exposure to SRB BSM
exhaust, Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS), paints and
primer from various sources, natural landing site products, and
carbon steel welding spheres. Textile and building insulation
fibers were also present. All of these materials have been
previously observed and occurred only in trace quantities.
There was no apparent vehicle damage related to these
residuals.
STS-61 ORGANIC ANALYSIS
The final results of the STS-61 organic analysis are shown in
Figure 17. Types of identified materials are those associated
with window covers (plastic polymers, rubber) and RCS thruster
cover adhesive. No new findings resulted from this particular
analysis.
NEW FINDINGS
This set of post-flight debris residual samples revealed a
second occurrence of an unusual finding in the window samples.
Blue paint particles were found in trace amounts that appeared
similar to those noted in STS-58 analysis testing. Due to the
small quantity of this sample, no conclusive organic
"fingerprint" analysis could be performed.
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I0 .0 POST L_UNCH AROP_%LIES
Based on the debris walkdowns and film/video review, five post
launch anomalies, including one In-Flight Anomaly (IFA), were
observed on the STS-61 mission.
10.1 LAUNCH PAD/SBUTTLE I_NDING FACILITY
i. Post launch inspection of the MLP deck revealed a i" x 1/4"
facility bolt on the west surface of the MLP deck near the FSS
cross over. A bolt was loose and a second missing from the E-15
camera protective cover. A bolt was missing and a cover plate
was opened on the E-27 camera protective cover. Both cameras
are located on the north end of the RH SRB exhaust hole.
2. The GH2 vent line was latched on the second tooth of the
latching mechanism and had no loose cables (static retract
lanyard). However, the GH2 vent line was outside the south
forward flexhose support struts and offset 8-10 inches from the
haunch centerline. As a result, the latching mechanism was not
centered. The crossbeam between the GUCP legs showed signs of
contact with the static retract lanyard.
10.2 _ TANK
i. No items.
10.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
I. A 2" x 0.5" x 0.2" divot occurred on the leading edge of a
GEI cork run (right forward segment XB-1099 at 220 degrees).
The remaining material was sooted and most likely lost during
ascent (IFA STS-61-I-01). Post flight lab analysis determined
the loss was not a material/processing failure. The most
probable cause of the cork loss is believed to be a debris
impact during ascent. Since no debris sources were identified
on the RH SRB forward of the damage site, ice from the ET L02
feedline bellows has been cited as the leading candidate.
2. Three BSM aero heatshield covers were missing. Post flight
assessment determined the covers had opened and latched
properly.
10.4 ORBITER
i. A 6" x 1/2" tile gap filler, or GSE shim, originated in the
body flap hinge gap and fell aft during SSME ignition.
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Appendix A. JSC Photographic Analysis Summary
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1.0 Mission Summary
STS-61 was the ground breaking Hubble Space Telescope (HST) repair mission. The orbital
inclination angle for this mission was 28.5 degrees and the initial orbiting altitude was 317
nautical miles. The crew on this mission consisted of: commander Richard Covey, pilot
Kenneth Bowersox, payload commander, Story Musgrave, and mission specialists Thomas
Akers, Jeff Hoffman, Claude Nicollier, and Kathryn Thornton.
1.1 Launch
The launch of Endeavour (OV-105) for STS-61 occurred from Pad B at 09:26:59.995
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) on December 2, 1993 (Day 336) as seen on camera E-8.
Solid rocket booster (SRB) separation occurred at 09:29:06.695 UTC as seen on camera ET-
212.
On launch day, 24 videos were screened. Following launch day, 51 films were reviewed.
Cameras E-l, E-9, and E-10 did not run. No potential anomalies were observed during
launch.
Detailed test objective (DTO)-312, photography of the external tank after separation, was
performed this mission using a handheld Hasselblad camera with a 250 mm lens. No
anomalies were verified from the handheld pictures of the external tank (ET). A booster
motor separation burn scar on the intertank is visible. A bright mark on the forward portion
of the intertank can be seen which was determined to be an antenna. The orientation and
details of the external tank are difficult to see because of the small image size of the tank.
Eighteen frames of the ET were acquired by the astronauts. Coverage of the SRB separation
was obtained by the 16 mm umbilical well camera.
Three left SRB frustum booster separation motor (BSM) aero heat shield covers were
missing at the time of recovery. Preliminary post flight analysis at Kennedy Space Center
(KSC) indicated that the covers had opened and latched properly and that the damage
probably occurred at water impact. Further analysis will be conducted at Marshall Space
Flight Center (MSFC).
1.2 On Orbit
No significant events were tracked on orbit.
1.3 Landing
Endeavour landed on runway 33 at KSC on December 13, 1993. Fourteen videos of the
Orbiter's approach and landing were received. NASA Select, which uses multiple views real-
time, was also received. Left main gear touchdown was at 347:05:25:32.537 UTC and fight
main gear touchdown occurred at 347:05:25:32.571 UTC as seen on camera KTV-33L. Nose
wheel touchdown occurred at 347:05:25:45.432 UTC as seen on camera KTV-5L. Wheel
stop was at 347:05:26:25 UTC as seen on camera KTV-33L.
On landing day, thirteen videos were screened. Five of the views were acquired from
infrared cameras and one view was acquired from an intensified visible camera. Following
landing day, twelve films were screened. No major anomalies were noted in any of the
approach, landing or rollout video and film views screened. During the post landing walk
around, slight tile damage was noted on the fight side of the Orbiter forward of the wing.
Also noted was a slightly frayed portion of the sill of the liquid oxygen (LO2) umbilical door.
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1.4 Timing Activities
All launch videos had timing and launch film cameras E-2, E-3, E-4, E-5, E-6, E-7, E-8,
E-11, E-12, E-13, E-14, E-15, E-16, E-17, E-18, E-19, E-20, E-25, E-26, E-52, E-54, E-
57, E-59, and E-222 had in-frame alphanumeric timing. All of the landing videos had
timing except cameras EL17 IR, EL18 IR, SLF North, and SLF South. The videos and
films containing timing were used to time specific mission events during the initial
screening.
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2.1 Debris
2.1.1 Debris near the Time of Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)
Ignition
2.1.1.1 ET/Orbiter Umbilical Disconnect Debris
(Cameras E-5, E-6, E-25, E-26, E-30, E-31, E-36, E52, E-57. OTV
109, and OTV-163)
Normal ice debris was noted falling from the liquid hydrogen (LH2) and LO2 ET/Orbiter
umbilical disconnect areas at SSME ignition through liftoff. On camera OTV-109, ice debris
appeared to strike the sill below the LH2 umbilical. There was no apparent damage to the
vehicle. No follow-up action has been requested.
2.1.1.2 Rectangular Shaped Debris Near the Body Flap
(Camera E- 17)
Figure 2. i. 1.2 Thin rectangular shaped debris falls along the body flap
A thin rectangular shaped piece of light colored debris was noted coming from the body flap
hinge area and fell aft along the body flap at SSME ignition. There was no apparent damage
to the vehicle. No follow-up action has been requested.
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2.1.1.3 LH2 and LO2 Tail Service Mast (TSM) T- 0 Umbilical Disconnect
Debris (Camercls E-2, E-17, E-18, E-19, E-20, E-76, E-7Z OTV-109,
OTV- 149, OTV- 170, cmd OTV- 171)
Normal ice debris was noted falling from the LH2 and LO2 TSM T-0 umbilical disconnect areas
at SSME ignition throvgh liftoff. None of the debris appeared to strike the vehicle.
2.1.2 Debris near the Time of SRB Ignition
2.1.2.1 SRB Flame Duct Debris (Task #7)
(Cameras E-7, E-8, E-/1, E-12, E-13, E-14, E-15, E-16, and E-62)
Several pieces of debris were noted originating from the SRB flame duct area after SRB
ignition. None of the debris was observed to strike the vehicle.
2.1.3 Debris after Liftoff
2.1.3.1 Debris Aft of the ET Between the SRBs
(Camera E222)
A light colored piece
the left wing and in
missions. See Figure
of debris, possibly umbilical purge barrier material, was noted below
between the SRBs. This type of debris has been seen on previous
2.1.3.1.
Figure 2.1.3.1 Debris shown between the SRBs at approximately 24 seconds mission
elapsed time (MET).
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2.1.3.2 Debris in SSME Plumes
(Cameras E-2, E-17, E-19, E- 54, E-76, E-207, E-212, E-213, E-220,
E-222, E-223, and E-224)
Multiple pieces of debris were seen falling aft of the Shuttle Launch Vehicle (SLV) at liftoff,
throughout the roll maneuver, and beyond on the launch tracking views. Most of the debris
sightings were probably reaction control system (RCS) paper or ice from the ET/Orbiter
umbilicals. None of the debris was observed to strike the vehicle. No follow-up action has
been requested.
2.1.3.3 Debris Reported by Crew (Task #10)
The commander and pilot reported that no unusual debris was visible from windows W l, W2
or W3 during launch and ascent with the exception of several white marks resembling white
paint on some of the windows.
2.2 Mobile Launch Platform (MLP) Events
2.2.1 Orange and Green Vapors (Possible Free-Burning Hydrogen)
(Cameras E-2, E-3, E-4, E-5, E-15, E-16, E-17, E-I& E-19, E-20, E-
30, E-36, E-41, E-52, E-62, E-76, E-77, OTV-163, OTV-170, and
OTV-171)
Figure 2.2.1 Green vapor shown to travel north below the body flap
(Note: photo inadvertantly printed backwards)
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Orange and green vapors have been seen on previous missions and are considered to be free
burning hydrogen. They are seen below the SSME bells and travel northward under the body
flap. This event is monitored to verify that the vapor does not carry up toward the ET/Orbiter
umbilicals (which might present a potential hazard). The vapor seen on this mission
remained well below the umbilicals.
2.2.2 Discoloration of RCS Cover
(Camera E-18)
A slight discoloration of the R4U RCS cover was noted prior to liftoff. Similar paper
discolorations were seen on STS-43, STS-56, and STS-58.
2.2.3 Flashes in SSME Plumes after SSME Ignition
(Cameras E-3, E-15, and E-16)
Multiple flashes were noted in both SSME #2 and #3 plumes at SSME ignition. Flashes in
SSME exhaust plumes have been seen on fifteen missions since reflight. No follow-up
analysis was requested.
2.3 Ascent Events
2.3.1 Body Flap Motion (Task #4)
(Cameras E-207, E-208, E-212, and E-220)
During ascent, slight body flap motion was noted during maximum dynamic pressure
(between 30 and 90 seconds MET). The magnitude of the motion seen on the STS-61 views
was not sufficient to warrant further analysis.
2.3.2 Recirculation (Task #1)
(Cameras E.204, E-208, E-212, E-218, ET-204, ET-208, ET-212 and
KTV-13)
The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV prior to SRB
separation has been seen on nearly all previous missions. The sighting of this event is
dependent upon launch inclination angle and cloud cover during ascent. For STS-61, the
start of recirculation was observed at about 93 seconds MET and the end was noted at
approximately 113 seconds MET on camera E-208.
Cameras on which recirculation was observed for STS-61
CAMERA
ET-204 93
ET-208 94
ET-212 94
KTV- 13
E-204
START (seconds MET)
96
*E-208 93
E-212 -93
E-218
STOP (seconds MET)
107
114
113
113
-109
* BEST VIEW OF RECIRCULATION
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2.3.3 Linear Optical Distortions
(Cameras E-212, E-218, and ET-208)
Several linear optical distortions were noted during ascent. These effects, seen on many
previous missions, were correlated to light waves being altered by the propagation of shock
waves through the atmosphere. No further action is required.
2.3.4 Debris Above and Below the SRB Exhaust Plumes
(Cameras E-207, E-208, E-212, E-213, E-218, ET-212, KTV-4B, and
KTV-5)
Several light pieces of debris were noted above and below the SRB exhaust plumes prior to
SRB separation. This debris is considered to be slag debris which has been seen on many
previous missions. No follow-up analysis was requested.
2.4 On Orbit
2.4.1 Analysis of Onboard Photography of the ET (DTO-312) (Task #6)
DTO-312 photography of the external tank after separation was acquired with a Hasselblad
camera with a 250 mm lens (Method 2). Eighteen frames of the ET were acquired by the
astronauts. The exposure and focus for all frames were good. Representative images are
shown in Figures 2.4.1 (a) & (b).
Figures 2.4.1 (a) & (b) Handheld camera view of ET after separation
(Frames STS061-71-003 & STS061-71-014)
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The first time the crew saw the external tank was after Endeavour was maneuvered for the
OMS burn to circularize their orbit. The pitch maneuver which is normally performed after
ET separation for DTO-312 was not performed on STS-61 in order to conserve propellants
for the HST capture. The first picture was taken at approximately 36 minutes MET (over
eastern Mozambique) and the last picture was taken at approximately 39 minutes MET (over
northern Madagascar). The external tank is very small on the pictures due the large distance
between the orbiter and the ET. The distance between the external tank and the orbiter was
measured to be - 10 kilometers for the first picture. Normally, this distance is ~ 1 kilometer.
No anomalies were verified from the pictures of the ET. A booster separation burn scar on
the intertank is visible. A bright mark on the forward portion of the intertank can be seen
which was determined to be an antenna.
2.4.2 Umbilical Well Camera Analysis (Task #5)
2.4.2.1 16 mm Umbilical Well Camera Views of SRB and ET Separation
One 16 mm motion picture film (with a 5 mm lens) was acquired from the Orbiter LH2
umbilical camera. The 16 mm film sequence of the SRB separation is good quality due to
the light from the boosters. The LSRB separation appeared normal. The 16 mm umbilical
film sequence of ET separation is dark and unusable due to the nighttime conditions. A few
frames of the 16 mm views of the external tank are partially exposed from what appears to be
light from occasional RCS firings but they are of no value for analysis.
Figure 2.4.2.1 16 mm camera with 5 mm lens view of the LSRB prior to separation
(Frame STS06 !- 1013-809)
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A dark, flexible strap like object was seen on the 16 mm umbilical well film prior to SRB
separation. (See Figure 2.4.2.1) The object was not identified but is possibly a piece of tape.
The object was fix'st seen near the base of the external tank and then moved in front of the left
SRB before leaving the field of view. The size of the object is unknown but is estimated to
be no larger than 18 inches assuming the object is close to the LSRB rather than near the
camera. A piece of debris, light colored on one side and dark or red colored on the other side
is visible just after SRB separation. The debris is somewhat square-shaped and has a flat
appearance. The debris is first visible near the aft -Y Orbiter/LSRB attach brace and then
falls aft along the LSRB. This debris has not been identified but it may be a piece of TPS
from the external tank.
Other items visible on the 16 mm film sequence of the SRB separation that were (typically)
seen on previous mission umbilical well camera film views were: multiple small light
colored pieces of debris of various shapes and sizes (probably from TPS erosion) are visible
before, during, and after SRB separation; the base of the -Y electric cable tray, the aft
ET/Orbiter attach brace and the ET/LSRB attach strut show the typical signs of TPS chipping
and erosion; and the -Y side of the LH2 umbilical TPS has a blistered appearance similar to
that of previous missions.
2.4.2.2 35 nun Umbilical Well Camera Views of ET Separation
The 35 mm film is dark and unusable. This film sequence, along with the 16 mm film
sequence containing ET separation, is underexposed due to nighttime conditions.
2.5 Landing Events
2.5.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis (Task #3)
Landing sink rates are calculated from both film and video sources when available. On this
mission, the best video view for generating sink rates was KTV-33L. For STS-61, nose gear
sink rate was not calculated using film due to the dark lighting conditions of the night
landing.
2.5.1.1 Sink Rate from Video
(Camera KTV-33L)
Camera KTV-33L was used to determine the sink rate of the main gear. Data was gathered
approximately 1 second prior to landing through touchdown at a rate of 30.0 frames per
second. Scalar information was determined by using the distance between the right and left
main landing gear struts. An assumption was made that the line of sight of the camera was
perpendicular to the Orbiter's z-axis. The y distance between the main gear and a reference
point was then multiplied by the scale to find the height of the main gear. These heights were
then regressed with respect to time, and the slope of the regression line is equal to the sink
rate. The main gear sink rate was determined to be 3.44 feet per second.
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Main Gear Height vs. Time
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Camera KTV-33L was used to determine the sink rate of the nose gear. Data was gathered
approximately 1 second prior to landing through touchdown at a rate of 30.0 frames per
second. NOTE: The lack of light affected the resolvability of the nose gear throughout this
time period. Scalar information was determined by using the distance between the right and
left main landing gear struts. An assumption was made that the line of sight of the camera
was perpendicular to the Orbiter's z-axis. The y distance between the nose gear and the main
gear was then, multiplied by the scale to find the height of the nose gear. These heights were
then regressed with respect to time, and the slope of the regression line was equal to the sink
rate. The nose gear sink rate was determined to be 3.43 feet per second.
Video Nose Gear Height vs. Time
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2.5.1.2 Sink Rate from Film
Camera EL-9 was used to determine the sink rate of the main gear. Data was gathered for
approximately 1 second prior to landing at a rate of 100 frames per second. Scalar
information was determined by using the distance between SSME bells #2 and #3. An
assumption was made that the line of sight of the camera was perpendicular to the Orbiter's
y-axis. Since the view was dark, and only the point of touchdown was visible, the motion of
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each reference point was tracked for one full second. These heights were then regressed with
respect to time, and the slope of the regression line was equal to the sink rate. The main gear
sink rate was determined to be 3.24 feet per second.
;TS-61 Main Gear Sink Rate 0EL-9)
45.003
. 3.24 ft/sec
_. 25.00 !
15.oo
5oo , .'
-5.00
o `5 o o ,5
Time Before Touchdown (sec)
2.5.2 Drag Chute Performance (Task #9)
(Cameras KTV-5L, KTV-11L, and KTV-15L)
The landing of Endeavour at the end of mission STS-61 marked the 12th deployment of the
Orbiter drag chute. All components of the drag chute appeared to deploy as expected. The
following are the times for specific drag chute events and cameras from which each time was
taken.
Drag chute initiation
Pilot chute inflation
Drag chute inflation in
reefed configuration
Drag chute inflation in
disreefed configuration
Drag chute release
347:05:25:41.429 UTC (KTV-11L)
347:05:25:42.729 UTC (KTV-5L)
347:05:25:44.132 UTC (KTV-11L)
347:05:25:47.532 UTC (KTV-15L)
347:05:26:07.652 UTC (KTV-15L)
Standard analysis of the drag chute angles as a function of time was performed using views
from film camera EL-7. This analysis is used to support the improvement of the
aerodynamic math models currently in use. During the first twenty seconds of deployment,
the maximum horizontal chute deflection was approximately 6.0 degrees.
2.6 Other Normal Events
Other normal events observed include: Fixed service structure (FSS) and MLP deluge water;
ice buildup on the SSME vent nozzles; frost on the gaseous oxygen (GOX) vent louvers on
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the ET, slight motion of the body flap between SSME ignition and liftoff; ice and vapor from
the gaseous oxygen umbilical carrier plate (GUCP) during SSME startup and arm retraction;
ice and vapor from both (TSM) umbilicals at liftoff; debris in the exhaust cloud at the pad
after liftoff; ET aft dome outgassing and vapor from the SRB stiffener rings after liftoff;
charring of the ET aft dome during ascent; flares in the SSME exhaust plume after the roll
maneuver; expansion waves; SRB plume brightening; slag debris in the SRB exhaust plume
during and after SRB separation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Space Shuttle Mission STS-61, the fifth flight of the
Orbiter Endeavour was conducted December 2, 1993 at
approximately 3:26 A.M. Central Standard Time from Launch
Complex 39B (LC-39B), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida.
Extensive photographic and video coverage was provided and has
been evaluated to determine proper operation of the ground and
flight hardware. Cameras (video and cine) providing this
coverage are located on the fixed service structure (FSS),
mobile launch platform (MLP), LC-39B perimeter sites, onboard,
and uprange and downrange tracking sites.
II. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES:
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis
objectives for STS-61 included, but were not limited to the
following:
a. Overall facility and Shuttle vehicle coverage for
anomaly detection
b. Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems
c. Determination of SRB PIC firing time and SRB
separation time
d. Verification of Thermal Protection System (TPS)
integrity
e. Correct operation of the following:
i. Holddown Post blast covers
2. SSME ignition
3. LH2 and LO2 17" disconnects
4. GH2 umbilical
5. TSM carrier plate umbilicals
6. Free hydrogen ignitors
7. Vehicle clearances
8. GH2 vent line retraction and latch back
9. Vehicle motion
III. CAMERA COVERAGE ASSESSMENT:
Film was received from forty-eight of fifty-three
requested cameras as well as video from all twenty-three
requested cameras. The following table illustrates the camera
data received at MSFC for STS-61.
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Canna da_ r_ at M_
f_ STS_
_BS
Peter
 kmg
Or_d
16ram 35ram 70ram Video
19 0 0 3
7 0 0 3
3 3 0 6
0 15 0 11
1 1 0 0
Totals 30 19 0 23
Total n_rber of cameras received _ MSFC 72
A detailed individual motion picture camera assessment is
provided as Appendix B. Appendix C contains detailed
assessments of the video products received at MSFC.
a. Ground Camera Coverage:
Photographic coverage of STS-61 was considered good.
Coverage was degraded due to the low light levels at night.
Film was not received from cameras E-l, 9, and i0 due to
mechanical failures on each camera.
b. Onboard Camera Assessment:
The astronauts carried a 35mm hand-held camera to record
film for evaluating the ET TPS integrity after ET separation.
The normal DTO was not performed. However, pictures were
acquired at a later time resulting in a smaller image size. Two
16mm motion picture cameras and one 35mm still camera were flown
on this mission in the orbiter's umbilical well to record the
SRB and ET separation. The 35mm and the 16mm umbilical film of
ET separation was dark and unusable. These films were
underexposed due to nighttime conditions. The 16mm film of SRB
separation was of good quality and usable.
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS:
a. General Observations:
While viewing the film, several events were noted which
occur on most missions. These included: pad debris rising and
falling as the vehicle lifts off; debris induced streaks in the
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SSME plume; ice falling from the 17" disconnects and umbilicals;
and debris particles falling aft of the vehicle during ascent,
which consist of RCS motor covers, hydrogen fire detection paper
and purge barrier material. Body flap and inboard right elevon
motions were noted during ascent.
b. Glowing debris from SRM plume
Figure 1 is a film frame from camera E-218 showing glowing
debris particles being ejected from the SRM plume. Several
pieces of glowing debris were noted during ascent. A copious
amount of glowing debris was noted exiting from the SRM at
separation. This debris is generally more visible during a
night launch due to the stronger contrast with the night sky.
c. Loose thermal curtain tape
Figure 2 shows a film frame from camera E-207 showing a
piece of thermal curtain tape which came from the left SRB. The
tape was estimated to be approximately 7 feet long.
Vo ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS:
a. T-Zero Times:
T-Zero times are determined from cameras which view the
SRB holddown posts numbers M-l, M-2, M-5 and M-6. These cameras
record the explosive bolt combustion products.
POST CAMERA POSITION TIME (UTC)
M-I E-9
M-2 E-8
M-5 E-12
M-6 E-13
no run
336:09:26:59.993
336:09:26:59.992
336:09:26:59.992
b. ET Tip Deflection:
Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was determined
to be approximately 30 inches. Figure 3 is a data plot showing
the measured motion of the ET tip in both the horizontal and
vertical directions. These data were derived from camera
OTV-161.
c. SRB Separation Time:
SRB separation time for STS-61 was determined to be
336:09:29:06.70 UTC as recorded by camera E-207.
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Figure i.
Glowing Debris Particles from SRM Plume at T+81 Seconds
Figure 2.
Thermal Curtian Tape from Left SRB
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ATTACHMENT I
IL NO.: 279-300-5509
1/21194
ROCKWELL ENGINEERING PHOTOGRAPHIC
ANALYSIS SUMMARY REPORT FOR STS-61
Extensive photographic and video coverage was provided and has been evaluated to
determine ground and flight performance. Cameras (cine and video) providing this
coverage are located on the Launch Complex 39B Fixed Service Structure (FSS), Mobile
Launch Platform (MLP), various perimeter sites, and uprange and downrange tracking
sites for the STS-61 launch conducted on December 2, 1993, at 1:27 a.m. PST/GMT
336:09:26:59.983 from the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and for the landing on
December 13, 1993 at KSC at 12:26 a.m. EST (December 12, 1993/9:26 p.m. PST)/GMT
347:05:25:33. Rockwell received launch films from 78 cameras (54 cine, 24 video) and
landing films from 23 cameras (12 cine, 11 video) to support the STS-61 photographic
evaluation effort. Three films, E-l, E-9 and E-10 were not available due to camera
malfunction.
Overall, the films showed STS-61 to be a clean flight. Several pieces of ice from the
ET/Orbiter umbilical were shaken loose at SSME ignition, but no damage to the Orbiter
Thermal Protection System (TPS) was apparent. The usual condensation and water
vapors were seen at the ET aft dome and the SRB stiffener tings and dissipated after the
completion of the roll maneuver. Charting of the El" aft dome, recirculation and
brightening of the SRB plumes were normal. Booster Separation Motor (BSM) firing and
SRB separation also appeared to be normal. However, upon retrieval, it was noted that
three of the BSM aero heat shield covers were missing on the left SRB. Preliminary post
flight analysis at KSC indicated that the covers were probably lost after SRB separation,
perhaps due to parachute riser entanglement or water impact.
Nominal performance was seen for the MLP and FSS hardware. FSS deluge water was
activated prior to SSME ignition and the MLP rainbirds were activated at approximately 1
second Mission Elapsed Time (MET), as is normal. All blast deflection shields closed
prior to direct SRB exhaust plume impingement. Both TSM umbilicals released and
retracted as designed. The ET GH 2 vent line carder dropped normally and latched
securely with a slight rebound. No anomalies were identified with the ET/ORB LH 2
umbilical hydrogen dispersal system hardware.
STS-61 was the nineteenth flight with the optimized attach link in the SRB holddown
support post Debris Containment Systems (DCS's). No holddown post hangups were
observed.
No major or significant events were observed or identified. Events noted by the Rockwell
f'tim/video users during the review and analysis of the STS-61 photographic items are summarized
in the following comments. There events are not considered to be a constraint to next flight.
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COMMENTS
. On Cameras OTV-109, OTV-149, OTV-170, E-2, E-17, E-18, E-19, E-20, E-76
and E-77, normal ice debris was seen falling from the LH2 and LO2 TSM T/O
umbilical disconnect areas at SSME ignition through liftoff. None of the debris
appeared to strike the vehicle. No follow-up action is planned.
. On cameras OTV-109, E-5, E-6, E-25, E-26, E-30, E-31 and E-36, normal ice
debris was seen falling from the LH2 and LO2 ET/Orbiter umbilical disconnect areas
at SSME ignition through liftoff. Several of these particles contacted the LH2
umbilical sill, but no damage was detected. No follow-up action is planned.
, A flat rectangular piece of light colored debris was seen moving from the body flap
hinge area and fall aft along the body flap after SSME ignition on camera E-17. The
debris did not appear to strike the vehicle and no damage was noted. No follow-up
action is planned.
. On cameras OTV-163, OTV-170, OTV-171, E-2, E-3, E-4, E-5, E-15, E-16, E-18,
E-19, E-20, E-30, E-36, E-41, E-52, E-62, E-76 and E-77, orange and green vapors
(possibly free burning hydrogen) were seen below the body flap at SSME ignition.
This vapor appears to be similar to the vapor noted on previous missions. It is not
an issue and no follow-up action is planned.
. Flashes were observed in the SSME #3 plume at SSME ignition (cameras E-3 and
E76). Flashes in the SSME plumes have been seen on previous mission. No follow-
up action is planned.
. On cameras E-2 and E-19, several (8-10) small particles of debris were noted in the
area between the right hand OMS pod and the vertical stabilizer falling aft after
SSME ignition. The particles probably originated from the top surface of the OMS
pod. No follow-up action is planned.
. A piece of light colored debris was seen falling aft of the Orbiter and past the left
SRB into the SRB plume at approximately 24 seconds MET on cameras KTV-4B,
E-207 and E-222. This debris was probably umbilical purge barrier material
(baggie). No follow-up action is planned.
. On camera E-207, several pieces of SRB thermal curtain tape were partially
detached from the SRB thermal curtains on both SRB's during ascent. No follow-up
action is planned.
. During the recovery of the SRB's it was noted that three of the BSM aero heat shield
covers were missing on the left SRB frustum. Preliminary post flight analysis at
KSC indicated that the covers had opened and latched properly and were probably
lost after SRB separation, perhaps due to parachute riser entanglement or water
impact. Additional analysis will be conducted at MSFC.
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10.
11.
12.
The following events have been reported on previous missions and observed on
STS-61. These are not of major concern, but are documented here for information
only:
• Ice debris falling from the ET/orbiter Umbilical disconnect area
• Debris (Insta-foam, water trough) in the holddown post area
and MLP
• Charting of the ET aft dome
• ET aft dome outgassing after liftoff
• RCS Paper debris
• Recirculation or expansion of burning gasses at the aft end of
the SLV prior to SRB separation
• Slight TPS erosion on the base heat shield during SSME
start-up
• Twang motion
• Body flap motion during the maximum dynamic pressure
(MAX-Q) region which appeared to have an amplitude and
frequency similar to those of previous missions
• Linear optical distortion, possibly caused by shock waves or
ambient meteorological conditions near the vehicle, during
ascent
• Slag in SRB plume after separation
• Vapor from the SRB stiffener tings after liftoff
• Fore-and aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the
centerline area between the SSME cluster at engine start-up
Camera E33 and E41 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. DV08P.010
requires an analysis of launch pad film data to verify that the initial ascent clearance
separation between the left SRB outer mold line and the falling ET umbilical
structure does not violate the acceptable margin of safety.
A qualitative assessment has been conducted and positive clearances between the left
SRB and the ET vent umbilical have been verified. The films showed nominal
launch pad hardware performance, and no anomalies were observed for the SRB
body trajectory.
Cameras E7-16-OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. DV08P.020 requires and
analysis of film data of SRM nozzle during liftoff to verify nozzle to holddown post
drift clearance.
A qualitative assessment of the launch films has been completed. No anomalies were
observed for the SRM nozzle trajectory and positive clearances between the SRB
nozzles and the holddown posts were verified.
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The landing of STS-61 occurred on Runway 33 at the KSC Shuttle Landing Facility.
Good video and film coverage were obtained and no anomalous events were
observed. The flight marked the twelfth use of the orbiter drag chute. The drag
parachute system performed as expected. All sequenced events occurred as
expected and no hardware anomalies were observed.
Any questions concerning this report should be directed to the undersigned.
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